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ABSTRACT
On March 17,

1988, Washington Mutual, an out-of-state,

little-known upstart, announced its intent to purchase the
company's major West Coast rival, H. F. Ahmanson (Home

Savings,) of Irwindale, California,

for $9.9 billion,

creating the nation's seventh-largest banking company.
This announcement came soon after Washington Mutual's

mergers with Great Western Financial and American Savings,

and propelled the company into the Southern California
market.

Washington Mutual successfully combined over twenty

financial institutions within a nine-year period of time.

The company now serves over 6 million households, operates
in 36 states, and is the largest mortgage lender■in the

country.
This project examines the Southern California and

Inland Empire banking environment during the period from
1992 to 1997. It includes an analysis of Washington
Mutual's market strategy, and financial strategy for

entering this fiercely competitive environment.

Washington

Mutual's competitive advantages and weaknesses will be
analyzed to understand its approach to capturing strong
market presence.
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The Inland Empire's economic conditions are evaluated
and analyzed, and the results indicate a potential for
economic growth, and prosperity, boding well for future

business success.

The company now has much wider

geographic diversity than in any other period in its
history, and as a result, Washington Mutual should be

better positioned to manage through any downturns in

regional economies in the years ahead.
Washington Mutual's post-merger performance and '
ongoing strategy are analyzed to determine that Washington

Mutual will continue to be a major contender for the
Southern California and Inland Empire markets.

Washington

Mutual has performed well in relation to the banking
industry and its major competitors.

Currently ranking as

the eighth largest financial institution in the country,

Washington Mutual has delivered impressive results.
This project is based upon research and a depth of

personal knowledge of Washington Mutual.

As a native of

Washington State, and a long-time customer of Washington

Mutual, my early recollections of this financial
institution go back to the early 1950's, when I stood in

line with my father and my grandfather at the Seattle Main
Branch to make a deposit to my college fund, established by
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my grandfather.

A visit to this institution, and making

that deposit was a tradition in my family.

As an eight

year-old, the vast marble lobby and formal business

atmosphere filled me with awe.

Today, banking has become

more casual, but the accomplishments of this financial

giant are nonetheless, remarkable.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

On March 17,

1998, Washington Mutual announced its

intent to purchase the company's major West Coast rival,
H.F. Ahmanson, parent of Home Savings,

for $9.9 billion,

creating the nation's seventh largest banking company
(Lane,

1998).

This announcement came only a year after

Washington Mutual's $6.6 billion merger with Great Western
Financial, and two years after its $20 billion acquisition
of American Savings (Eps,

1997).

This strategic merger

dramatically propelled the company into the Southern

California Market, and provided the institution with the

breadth to challenge banking giants BofA and Wells Fargo

Bank.
We at Arrowhead Credit Union recognized that

Washington Mutual, almost overnight, became a major
competitor, about which we knew very little.

This paper

will assist Arrowhead Credit Union in planning
strategically to face new competition in a rapidly changing
banking environment.

The information contained herein will

enable the Credit Union to capitalize on unique
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opportunities that are created by Washington Mutual's
mergers and entry into our market area.
This project specifically covers the banking industry

during the years 1992 to 1998, Washington Mutual's market

strategy for entering the competitive Southern California
market, an-analysis of Washington Mutual's customers,

products, and an analysis of their financial performance
both pre and post merger.

This paper concludes with an

assessment of the regional differences between Southern
California and Northwest banking culture and outlines the
challenges Washington Mutual faces in its new and larger

market environment.

Some of the research for this paper, particularly the
analysis of Washington Mutual's corporate culture,

is based

upon personal interviews with Washington Mutual employees.
I spoke with friends who are employed by Washington Mutual,
as well as strangers working at various retail locations in

California and Washington to help me understand the culture
of this organization.
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CHAPTER TWO
WASHINGTON MUTUAL'S ENTRY TO
THE CALIFORNIA MARKET

On June 6,

1889, a glue pot in a downtown Seattle

cabinet shop bubbled over and ignited wood shavings lying
on the floor.

Within minutes the business was engulfed in

flames, and by the following morning twenty-nine city
blocks were completely destroyed (Lang,

1999).

The Washington National Building and Loan Investment

Association, was incorporated on September 25,

1889, to

help people rebuild their homes and businesses after the
The first monthly-installment home loan was made to

fire.

a Norwegian-born seaman, who used the $700 he borrowed to
build a house in the Ballard neighborhood of Seattle.

Over

two thousand loans were granted during the rebuilding
process

(wamu.com,

1999).

On June 25, 1908, The Washington National Building and
Loan Investment Association changed its name to Washington

Savings and Loan Association (wamu.com,

1999).

The company's association with investment banking
began in 1911, when Eugene Favre, co-founder of Murphey
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Favre, Inc., of Spokane, became a member of the board of

directors.
In 1930, officials of Continental Mutual Savings Bank

asked Washington Savings and Loan Association to purchase

their bank, which was facing financial ruin during the

early years of the Great Depression.

The purchase was

completed and Continental became Washington Mutual's first
acquisition.

The establishment of a relationship between a bank and
an investment firm was innovative in 1911, but in 1983,

when Washington Mutual acquired Murphey Favre,

it was the

first bank to acquire a full-service securities brokerage
firm in the nation.

Originally Washington Mutual was a true mutual savings

bank, owned by its depositors.

For many years the company

followed the traditional role of mutual institutions.

Profit maximization was not a high priority, and high
expenses were the norm.

The company changed from a mutual

to a stock form of organization in 1983 due to the
limitations it faced in raising capital under the mutual

form of ownership.
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The initial public offering of the bank's stock took

place on March 11,1983, ’and the stock quickly sold out.
$72 million in capital was raised, 26 percent more than

expected (wamu.com,

1999).

With the Murphey Favre acquisition came Kerry
Killinger, Washington Mutual's CEO.

Then just 33,

Killinger set about to mastermind most of the company's

growth by acquisition.

During the period between 1982 and

1999, Washington Mutual acquired 23 banks,

19 of which were

acquired after Killinger was named chief executive officer.

Washington Mutual is a financial services company
serving consumers and small to mid-sized businesses.

Its

subsidiaries provide consumer and commercial banking
services,

securities brokerage, mutual fund management,

property/casualty and insurance sales, and underwriting for
insurance annuities.

The company operates principally in California,

Washington, Oregon, Florida, Idaho, Texas and Utah, but has
operations in a total of 36 states.

The company has plans

to diversify and expand its national business over the next

five years, starting with 15 new financial centers in the
Las Vegas area in mid 2000.

Washington Mutual serves six

5

million households and is currently the eighth largest
thrift institution in the nation, with $150 billion in

assets.

The company is the largest mortgage lender on the

West Coast

(Lane, 1998).

With the recent acquisitions and mergers, Washington
Mutual has strengthened its competitive position in

California, the nation's most populous state.

The

combination of Home Savings, Great Western, American

Savings, and Coast Savings makes California integral to

Washington Mutual's future.

They fully intend to be as

involved in the California communities as they are in their
other markets, while continuing to offer consumer banking

and home mortgage expertise to low and moderate-income

families and individuals.
Most of Washington Mutual's growth since 1988 has

occurred as a result of banking business combinations. The

table shown in Appendix A, titled Washington Mutual Merger

History,

summarizes Washington Mutual's mergers and

acquisitions since April 1988.
Washington Mutual, after the merger with H. F.
Ahmanson & Company, had $86.3 billion in deposits, and more

than 2,000 retail banking branches, loan offices, consumer
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finance locations, and commercial bank branches.

The

combined company became the nation's leading adjustable-

rate mortgage lender.

The merger also expanded Washington

Mutual's reach into Texas with more than 40 branches in
that state (Annual Report,

1999).

Following the completion of the merger with H. F.
Ahmanson, Washington Mutual became California's second-

largest depository institution, with a 17% market share.
Only Bank of America holds a larger deposit base and market

share.

In addition,

the company is among the top three

institutions, based on deposit market share,

metropolitan market in California.

in every major

The combined company is

managed from locations in Chatsworth,

Irvine, and Stockton,

and from Washington Mutual's headquarters in Seattle (King,
1998).

The A. H. Ahmanson merger had the most profound affect
upon the company.

See the table shown in Appendix A, Page

49, titled Washington Mutual/Ahmanson Merger Effects.

Washington Mutual and Ahmanson integrated operations

after completion of the Great Western merger.
integration was completed in mid 1999.
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CHAPTER THREE

THE BANKING INDUSTRY IN
THE INLAND EMPIRE

Banks in the Inland Empire
The Big Banks

Washington Mutual was not the only financial

institution to undergo huge mergers in an attempt to gain

market share.

Giants Security Pacific and Bank of America

combined in 1991, and First Interstate and Wells Fargo

merged in 1995.

In 1998, Bank of America and eastern giant

NationsBank merged to form a $567 billion institution with
over 5,000 branches across the country.

Meanwhile,

the

Inland Empire has been affected by the national trend
toward creation of mega-banks with mega market shares with

the merger of California Federal, Glendale Federal, Cenfed
Bank, and Redlands Federal Bank.

These combined

institutions operate under the name GoldenState Bancorp.
The table in Appendix A, page 50, titled Washington

Mutual/GoldenState Bancorp Merger Effects,

shows these two

mergers and their resulting market share.

The top four financial institutions in the Inland
Empire hold 56.1% of all area bank deposits.

8

These are:

Washington Mutual, Bank of America, GoldenState Bancorp,
and Wells Fargo Bank.

Washington Mutual ranks first, with

more deposits than Bank of America.

The newly formed

GoldenState Bancorp ranks third,, ahead of Wells Fargo

(Husing,

1998) .

Though the top four institutions hold significant
market share,

the deposits in these institutions have

fallen since 1992.

Combined,

they held $12.5 billion in

deposits in 1992, but this figure was down to $11.2 billion

in 1997, which represents a reduction of 10.1%.

The top

four fell from a 60.4% market share to a 56.1% market
share, or a loss of 4.3%. This change is shown in Appendix

A,

titled Change in Bank Deposits.
The group that forms Washington Mutual saw its

deposits grow to $4.2 billion in 1995, with a drop of $364

million by the end of 1997.

The GoldenState Bancorp group

grew steadily since 1992, but peaked in 1996 at $2.0
billion.

By 1997 deposits declined by $42 million (Husing,

1998).

The Mid-Sized Banks
The group of mid-sized banks appears to be gaining

market share as shown in Appendix A, Mid-size Bank Deposits
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by Year.

This group saw its Inland Empire deposits grow

$1.14 billion or 34.5% from 1992 to 1997, despite a
downward trend in the region's total deposits.

Union Bank has increased its share the most since

1992, but appears to have peaked in 1993.

Its early

success did not sustain itself after it captured much of
the customer fallout from the Bank of America,

Pacific merger.

Security

Since 1992, Downey Savings has grown

consistently in deposits due to rapid expansion of its
supermarket branches.

Citizens Business Bank,

PFF Bank and

Trust, and World Savings have seen consistent increases in

deposits, and Hemet Federal and Provident have grown
slowly, but steadily (Husing, 1998).
The Regional Banks and
Small Community Banks

There are seven Southern California regional banks or

financial institutions with Inland Empire branches: City
National Bank, First Security Bank (recently announced a

merger bid from Wells Fargo,) Western Financial Savings

Bank, Fireside Thrift, Jackson National

(which recently

acquired Fidelity Federal,) Sanwa'Bank, and Fremont

Investment.

There are approximately forty small community

banks operating in specific market niches in the Inland
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Empire.

Among these are Inland Community Bank, Redlands

Centennial Bank, Upland Bank, Desert Community Bank, and
Foothill Bank.

In 1997, these institutions held $3.16

billion in deposits.

In 1992,

there were 62 regional and

community banks with $3.23 billion.

The 1997 figure

represents a decrease of $72 million, and 14 fewer banks.
Market share during this period rose from 15.6% to 15.8%
during this time of overall market decline.

In 1995-1997,

deposits in this group rose $429 million or 15.7% and

market share increased from 13.9% in 1995, to 15.8% in

1997 .
The fastest growth was reported by Desert Community
Bank, with an increase of $105 million from 1992-1997

(134.8%), with Foothill Independent Bank up $72.1

(83.8%).

Of this group, City National Bank reported the highest

deposits at $231 million,
$212 million.

followed by Bank of Hemet with

Bank of Hemet is now part of an acquisition

by Guaranty Federal.

The Credit Unions
The smallest share of deposits is held by the 37

credit unions in the Inland Empire.

In 1997, credit unions

had $1.18 billion in deposits, or 5.9% of the Inland Empire
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market.

In 1992, credit unions held $942 million and had a

4.5% share of the market.

Credit union deposits grew by

$241 million (25.6%) in the period, and their share of the

market grew by 1.4%.

Arrowhead Credit Union added the most

deposits with an increase $253 million.

Other Inland

Empire credit unions showing deposit increases were March
Federal Credit Union, with $141 million, Riverside Schools
Credit Union, with $137 million, Norton Credit Union, with

$111 million, and Riverside County Credit Union, with $76

million.

Riverside Schools Credit Union and Riverside

County Credit Union have since merged and are known as
Riverside County's Credit Union.
From 1992 to 1997, Inland Empire financial

institutions have seen deposit volume fall from $20.69
billion to $20.03 billion, a $659 million drop.

Since

1997, the volume of deposits has grown slowly but
consistently, rising $646 million from the low of $19.39

billion.

The chart in Appendix A, Bank Deposits by Size,

shows that the Big-4 mega-banks saw their inland region
deposits decline by $1.26 billion from $12.51 billion in
1992, to $11.24 billion in 1997.
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Market shares have changed as a result of mergers,
failures,

successes and difficulties of the various

categories of Inland Empire financial institutions.

The

megabanks have seen market share fall from 60.4% to 56.1%,
a 3.4% decline in share.

The intermediate sized banks have

seen their market share increase a dramatic 6.2%, rising

from 16.0% to 22.2%.

The region's small,

low penetration

banks saw only a 0.2% increase since 1992.

Credit Unions,

target of attacks by banks on issues of fields of

membership and taxation,
1.4% over the period.

increased market share by only

Appendix A, Bank Market Share,

illustrates changes in market share for the period.
In summary, as the big banks lose market share,

Washington Mutual will have to maintain an aggressive
attitude in attracting new depositors to stem the tide of
customers leaving it because of the merger.

The deposit

and market share data show that there is no loyalty to
interlopers and branch convenience loses its appeal if

products,

service, or people change.

The phenomenon of customers leaving financial
institutions due to a merger will be analyzed in more
detail later in this project after examining Washington
Mutual's Culture.
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CHAPTER FOUR
. OVERVIEW OF THE. INLAND
EMPIRE ECONOMY

During Washington Mutual's high-growth years, both the
U.S. and the Inland Empire economy experienced historic
The national economy has grown over 4% for three

growth.

consecutive years, and worker productivity is rising.
Unemployment is just 4.1%.
annually (Husing,

1998).

Prices are rising at just 2.9%
The federal government is running

surpluses and-paying down its debt.

The stock market is

fluctuating at or near record highs, and, though interest
rates are rising,

they remain well below their long-term

averages.
Local unemployment is at 4.5%, its lowest level since
1965.

The surge in Inland Empire population and employment

is fueling local prosperity, but average incomes and

standard of living are growing at moderate rates.
The economic changes highlighted below are depicted
graphically in Appendix B.

The Inland Empire Business Journal, November 1999,

reports the following:
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■

The population of the Inland Empire has grown 2.1% per

annum since 1990, adding 538,521 people to reach a total

population of 3,127,314.
state,

■

If the Inland Empire were a

it would rank 30th in population.

San Bernardino County is the nation's largest in terms of

landmass, with 20,131 square miles.

Riverside County

measures 7,200 square miles, making it the fourth largest
in California.

■

About one in every five Inland Empire residents is under
the age of 18.

Eight percent of the region's population

is over the age of 65.

■

The Inland Empire added 168,080 jobs between 1990 and
1998, an increase of 23.1%.

■

Personal incomes have grown 12.5% faster than inflation,

and as population and incomes have grown, The region's
total personal income of $57.4 billion in 1996, exceeded

that of 18 states.
■

The Inland Empire ranked seventh among regions in the

nation for new and expanded corporate facilities in 1998.
The region ranked third in the nation for new

manufacturing facilities that year, behind Detroit and
Chicago.

15

■

In Riverside County, the number of unemployed workers

declined from 68,400 in 1992, to 38,300 in 1999.

In San

Bernardino County the number of unemployed workers

declined from 64,300 in 1992, to 36,800 in 1999.
■

From 1997 to 1999, jobs in the construction sector grew
cmost rapidly, up 3 4%-,
manufacturing, up 13%,

followed by transportation, up 16%,
services, up 12%,

finance and real

estate, up 7%, government, up 7% and retail, up 5%.

■

The inflation rate in the Inland Empire outpaced the
United States in 1999, for the first time since 1992.

■

The Purchasing Managers Index remained over 50 each month
of the year 1999, indicating manufacturing expansion.

■

Despite bank mergers,

the number of financial institution

employees has risen each year since 1995.

■

Deposits at Inland Empire financial institutions rose

nearly $500 million from 1998 to 1999.
■

In 1999, there were 204 financial institution branches in

San Bernardino,

the lowest since a peak of 251 in 1992.

In Riverside County, the 1999 low was 223, with a peak of

273 in 1992.

Throughout Southern California history,

the prime area

of rapid population and job expansion has been the area
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with vacant land.

The San Fernando Valley in the 50's,

the

San Gabriel Valley in the 60's, and Orange County in the

70's, populated Southern California.

Empire is the area of rapid growth.

Today,

the Inland

Land and home prices

are affordable, industrial rents are inexpensive, and bluecollar job sectors are growing.

White-collar jobs will

follow, as graduates of the area's numerous colleges and
universities take advantage of growth opportunities of new

business sectors migrating to the Inland Empire.
The growth and economic promise of the Inland Empire

make it an inviting place to do business.
chapters,

In the next

this project deals with the specifics of

Washington Mutual's corporate culture, an analysis of their
target customer, and an overview of their products to

determine whether or not the business climate in the Inland

Empire is a good match for their style of banking.
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CHAPTER FIVE

WASHINGTON MUTUAL'S
CORPORATE CULTURE

Kerry Killinger joined Washington Mutual in 1983, and

has shaped and changed the culture of the organization
dramatically over the last ten years.

At 48, he has been

Chairman of the Board since 1991, Chief Executive Officer
since 1990, and Senior Executive Vice President since 1986.

Known as a dealmaker, Killinger is now focusing the
organization on absorbing his latest California
acquisition, but he never lets his eye roam far from

opportunities that may come his way.

Jim Bradshaw of

Pacific Crest Securities in Portland says "Killinger
appears to enjoy the spotlight but does not feed off it.
He is a solid,

sensible kid from Iowa.

He is very focused,

plays one card at a time and wants to win the game."
Washington Mutual, under Killinger’s direction, has

grown from a little known, regional'savings bank to a huge
consumer bank without missing a step.

Though a growth-by

acquisition strategy was in place when Killinger joined

Washington Mutual, he is .still the architect of their
phenomenal growth, drawing- on his instincts, personality,
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and skills to build one of the nation's most successful
companies.

He is known as a dealmaker, aggressive,

analytical and ambitious.

He is also known as a very nice,

likable person, and that has been helpful to him in his

business dealings and with staff morale, which is critical
when merging institutions.

Before he joined Murphey Favre,

which Washington Mutual acquired in the early 80's,
Killinger worked as an investment analyst at Banker's Life
Insurance in Nebraska.

This is where he learned how

seriously the investment community relies upon the word of
a chief executive.

all about (Morris,

He understands well what Wall Street is

1997).

Though Killinger is known as a dealmaker, he has also
been extremely successful at putting together a management

team who can make the deals work.
acquisitions,

They evaluate

they are fast and efficient with the merger

process, and they turn their marketing crews loose so they
can quickly generate revenues.

trained and very loyal.

His senior people are well

Most of the management team at

Washington Mutual has been there since the early to mid
1980's, about the time Killinger came on board.

Only four

members of the twelve person executive team joined the
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organization in the 1990's.

One of those four rejoined the

company after a stint with the FDIC (Washington Mutual

Annual Report,

1999).

Washington Mutual's Board of Directors appears to
allow Killinger, its Chairman,

to run the company.

The

Board, a sixteen-member team, has diverse experience and
long-term tenure.

The most recent additions to the Board

have been CEOs and Chairmen of recently merged

institutions.

Washington Mutual's Board Members receive

$41,800 in fees and annual retainers, excluding stock

options, payment for committee work and other perks.

The

Washington Mutual Board of Directors' pay ranked fourth

among top Northwest companies, preceded by Weyerhaeuser,
Paccar, and Boeing (Seattle Times,

1999).

As a consumer lending institution, Washington Mutual

gets high marks for its emphasis on personal service.

For

example, unlike most commercial banks, Washington Mutual
staffs its grocery-store branches with tellers; customer

service desks are positioned near the front door of the
traditional branches so customers can be greeted shortly

after they enter.

To check'up on its employees,
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the

company sends "secret shoppers", who rate customer service,
to each of its branches four times a year.

The company's corporate culture appears to be warm and
friendly despite their rapid expansion.

They have shed

their stodgy banker image and at corporate headquarters;

employees have a business casual dress code Monday through
Thursday and dress casually on Friday.

The institution is well known for its commitment to

the Pacific Northwest and its communities,

and their customers.

their employees,

They have high visibility in the

Northwest and are major corporate sponsors for many

community events.
The bank demonstrates corporate responsibility in many
ways beyond mandated Community Redevelopment Act rules.

They have a commitment to enhance the social and economic
well being of the communities in which they operate.

In

1998, the corporation announced a ten-year $120 billion
community reinvestment commitment.

The majority of the

funds will go towards affordable housing, with
approximately $25 billion earmarked for small business

lending.
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Washington Mutual cares about people in need and helps
them through challenging times.

In emergency situations

the company responds with relief initiatives easing

victims' distress.

For example, due to the strong 1996

year-end storm season, Washington Mutual customers who

suffered damage to their property received no-fee equity

loans at reduced rates.

The company also aids communities

by allowing its employees four hours of paid volunteerism

time each month.

The Washington Mutual Committed Active Neighbors
Program (CAN!) donates both funds and volunteers to the

local schools.

Each time a checking account is opened at a

local branch office,

the bank donates one dollar for local

schools in that community.
support,

In addition to this monetary

employees participate in the One-to-One Tutor

Program, which recruits and refers volunteers to schools
and non-profit tutoring organizations.

Washington Mutual

also supports a School Savings program that teaches

students about developing basic financial skills.
The term "A friend of the family®" has been their
motto in the Northwest for many years.

That motto has not

been used in conjunction with their advertising in the
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Southern California area, perhaps because they realize that
they can't be "a friend of the family" until they are at

least better acquainted with their new market areas.

They

have also used other folksy ad campaigns that are well

known to Northwesterners.

These ads reflect their

"hometown/homegrown" culture, and will not be used in the

near future in the California market because the bank is

still considered an out-of-state institution.

Locally,

their advertising has been folksy, but geared toward teller

friendliness and specific products.

Recently they have

used "join the club" in their television commercials.

This

phrase communicates a feeling of belonging or specialness
in being a bank customer, a competitive advantage that

credit unions have long realized.
Washington Mutual has a reputation for treating its
customers and employees well.

They have a healthy

relationship with new employees from merged institutions.
In a telephone interview with Cathy,Llamas,

the Assistant

Branch Manager of the former American Savings branch

located on Highland Avenue in San Bernardino,

it was

disclosed that the transition from American to Washington

Mutual was relatively easy for her branch.
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She was an

employee of American Savings for twenty years and was

apprehensive about the merger, worried about customers and

other employees.

She felt that the new bank treated

employees well and worked hard to preserve many of the

benefits that the employees had earned during their tenure

with American Savings, even though some of those benefits
differed from what Washington Mutual offers new employees.

She also acknowledged that other American Savings employees
did not feel this way as there had been some branch
closures and layoffs at other locations.

The organization appears to have a strong sales and
retailing culture.

Their sales culture is more clearly

designed and visible than at most banks.

consistent across channels.
brochures,

Their image is

Their internet web page,

signage, ATM's and branches all portray a clean

uncluttered and colorful image.

They follow-up phone calls

with letters and deliver information promised.

This was

evidenced by my requests for information in gathering data

for this project.

They call their non-teller branch

employees sales reps, not customer service reps, as most

institutions do.

They do this because they believe that

sales and service go hand-in-hand, but without sales they
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would have no customers to service.

Branch managers hold

sales meetings every morning before the branch opens, and
their regional manager meets with them on a monthly basis
to discuss sales and progress toward branch goals.

The

sales staff is paid commission for cross sales and
referrals.

During 1997, Washington Mutual designed a program
called "WAMU Shares," a one-time stock option grant
designed to compensate full and part time employees and to

reinforce a "think-like-the-shareholder" attitude in their

day to day decision making.

This opportunity goes a long

way to make employees of newly acquired institutions, as
well as long-time employees, take ownership and embrace the

culture of the organization.

Also during 1997, a decision was made to retain
the name Washington Mutual for all consumer banking and
mortgage lending operations.

They believe that a common

name in all markets should raise brand awareness and

increase sales, and lead to progress toward a common
corporate culture.
According to common knowledge in the banking industry,

Washington Mutual's management team is known for its
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ability to quickly integrate their culture into
organizations that merged with them.

These strategic

decisions have been the catalyst to achieve quick

integration and a positive image despite some branch

closures and layoffs.

The organization appears to have a robust and positive

corporate culture.

They follow their leader and are proud

of the service they provide their customers,

the growth and

expansion of the company, and the value that growth has
brought to the shareholders of the company.

Having analyzed Washington Mutual's corporate culture,
the next chapter deals specifically with their customers
and their target market.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE CUSTOMERS

Washington Mutual's customer base can be segmented
into three broad categories of consumers.

■

These are:

The fee conscious individuals, in the 18-34 age

range, with annual incomes under $25,000.

■

The middle-market consumer,

in the 35-55 age range,

with annual incomes between $25,000 and $50,000.

■

The upscale individual, in the over age 55 range,
with annual income of over $50,000.

Washington Mutual's consumer base consists of all
three groups.

However, their aggressive marketing and mass

appeal goes primarily to low-to middle-income families who
are likely to need basic banking services and mortgage

loans.

The bank relies heavily upon their free checking

account to capture this market.

Free checking accounts are

only free if bounced checks and overdrafts do not occur.

Washington Mutual has a liberal Non-Sufficient-Funds
policy, allowing customers to bounce checks.

The net

result is.a product consumers want, and enormous fee income

for the bank.

In addition, this strategy provides an
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excellent customer base to which mortgages and other retail

products can be marketed.
As one of the nation's'largest home loan originators,

Washington Mutual also has a large portion of their
customer base in the middle income group.

These customers

typically have more disposable income and, depending upon
where they have their checking account, may or may not

consider Washington Mutual to be their primary financial
institution.

This group of customers typically uses the

bank's branch offices less frequently but they are

certainly a target group for deposit and some investment
products.

The role of the branch sales rep, mentioned in

the prior chapter, certainly is to get more of this

customer's banking business.

Washington Mutual's early acquisition of the
investment brokerage firm Murphey Favre, gave them a

reputation as a good place for upscale consumers to do
business.

Washington Mutual was one of the first banks to

use personal bankers for their upscale and wealthy senior
business.

This segment is attractive to the bank for both

its fee producing possibility and investment and insurance
services.

28

Aside from consumer and investment business,

Washington Mutual also focuses on the financial and banking
needs of the business community.

They target small to

medium size businesses and have added a full array of

business products to appeal to this market segment.

The

bank has focused heavily on this segment over the past few

years and designed new products to assist start-up
companies in hopes of attracting not only the business, but

their employees to the bank as well.
In summary, Washington Mutual's customers can be

easily segmented so that their marketing efforts can be

specifically targeted.

They have identified who their

customers are, and their array of products, as described in
the next chapter, have been designed to clearly appeal to

those defined segments.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

THE PRODUCTS

Washington Mutual's core product offering is their
Free Checking account.

With no monthly service fees, no

minimum balances, no fees for ATM and point of sale (POS),

teller.access, or telephone access,

their product is well

positioned against similar products offered by their major
competitors.

The chart on page 59 illustrates how their

product compares to products offered by Bank of America,

Wells Fargo and California Federal.

Their Free Checking

product attracts new customers who are looking for low-cost

banking services.

This product is clearly the most

competitive product on the market and Washington Mutual has
maintained their focus on attracting new customers.to the
bank with this product.

Washington Mutual also offers a variety of other

checking products to meet the’needs•of individuals who
don't mind maintaining higher balances provided they

receive interest or other benefits such as free checks or
upgraded check card access.

For a low $4.00 monthly fee

they offer all of the benefits of their Free Checking

product, plus other conveniences such as free checks,
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free

travelers checks, bank checks or money orders,

liability

protection on credit, debit, or ATM cards, and free
accidental death insurance coverage.

All of the checking

products offered by Washington Mutual are low-cost, highvalue products with broad appeal. ■

Washington Mutual also offers a variety of savings
products to target the middle income segment of their

market.
products.

The chart on page 60 shows an overview of these

There appears to be nothing unique about most of

these products that would draw hew customers to the bank.

They all have features that are common to features offered
by other financial institutions, and generally they all pay
interest comparable to rates paid elsewhere.

From time to time Washington Mutual does offer higherthan-market rates on their Money Market and Certificate

accounts to attract new depositors.

When they do this,

they utilize full-page newspaper ads to mass-market.

These

rates attract middle income and upscale depositors who want

the benefits of a high-rate product and the security of

FDIC insurance on their deposits.

Washington Mutual's consumer lending products are

typical of those offered by their major competitors.
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They

offer a full array of personal loans, personal credit

lines,

credit cards, student loans, vehicle, boat and

recreational vehicle loans.

There are no unique features

to these products that would attract new customers to the

bank.
Where Washington Mutual truly stands out is with their

consumer real estate products.

They offer Manufactured

Housing loans up to $250,000, which many lenders do not
offer.

And, they offer these loans at fixed interest

rates, which is not typical of other lenders who make these

kinds of loans.

There other excellent real estate product

is their home equity loan called On the House™.

This

product features a low introductory interest rate and
customers can access their credit line with a Platinum

Visa® card.

This adds up to real convenience for their

customers and attracts new middle income and upscale
customers to the bank.

First mortgage loan products include permanent home

financing as well as loans for the construction of single
family residences.

Permanent loans made available to

consumers include conventional fixed-rate and adjustable-

mortgages, FHA-insured, and VA-guaranteed fixed-rate
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mortgage loans.

All loans are offered with a variety of

maturities and amortization schedules.

The bank generally

securitizes a majority of their fixed rate loans and sells

the securities to third-party investors.

They generally

retain their adjustable-rate mortgage loans in their loan

portfolio.

These are common practices in the mortgage

banking industry.
The Mortgage Banking Group serves over 1.2 million

households in meeting their needs throughout the United

States and is the nation's fifth largest loan originator of
mortgage loans.

The Mortgage Banking Group offers a broad

array of single family residential mortgage products in 29
states and the District of Columbia through multiple

distribution channels, including the internet (Washington

Mutual Annual Report,

1999).

During 1999, the bank entered into a strategic

alliance with Fannie Mae, under which most of the sales and
securitizations of their fixed-rate conforming mortgage

loans would be to Fannie Mae.

The bank uses their own

underwriting system to originate the loans and works with
Fannie Mae to share the credit risk management and to
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■

develop new products in the future.

Annual Report,

(Washington Mutual

1999).

Their home loan penetration can be attributed to the

fact that they are not afraid to take risks and they have
adapted to the market place.

In the Northwest, Washington

Mutual has penetrated the home loan market with loans for
manufactured homes and flexible land programs.

Washington Mutual showed foresight by merging with
Spokane-based brokerage Murphey Favre in the early 1980's,

with the vision that consumers would gravitate toward the

mutual fund and investment markets.

The Financial Services

Group of Washington Mutual (WMFS) offers a wide range of
investment products including mutual funds, variable and

fixed annuities, and general securities.

These products

appeal to the upscale market segment and attract new
investors to the bank.
WMFS has licensed representatives in Washington Mutual
branch offices who deal with customers who want these non

insured investment products.

The representatives have a

variety educational material available to clients and offer
financial planning to assist clients in making important

investment decisions. The WMFS website offers both on-line
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trading and stock research tools to appeal to customers who

are simply looking for information about a stock, or wish
to trade electronically.

WM Fund Advisors, Inc. is a registered investment

advisor and distributor for the WM Group of Funds,

the

Strategic Asset Management (SAM) Portfolio, and the
Strategic Asset Management Variable Annuity.

The WM Group

of Funds is a family of mutual funds managed by WM Fund

Advisors, Inc.

These funds have been under management

since 1939, and offer equity funds,

exempt, and money market funds.

fixed income funds,

tax

Analysis of the

performance of these funds is accessible on their website,

and purchases may be made through the website with a $5000
minimum investment.

The Strategic Asset Management Portfolios include a
Strategic Growth Portfolio, Conservative Growth Portfolio,

Conservative Balanced Portfolio and Flexible Income

Portfolio.

These funds require a $5,000 minimum investment

and can be purchased through the WMFS representative in
Washington Mutual Branch offices, or they can be purchased
on line through the WM Group of Funds, Inc. website.
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Insurance products are sold through Washington Mutual
Insurance Services, Inc.

(WAMUINS).

The insurance agency-

supports the mortgage lending process by offering
everything from fire, homeowners,

flood, and earthquake

insurance to pet insurance and home warranty insurance.
The insurance products are extremely competitive and

attract the middle market and upscale segments of

Washington Mutual's customers.
Washington Mutual does not have a huge presence in the
commercial banking arena, but this area has been identified

by top management as a key strategic initiative for the

next several years.
1999).

(Washington Mutual Annual Report,

The commercial banking group consists of two

primary business lines: commercial banking, operating under
the brand names of WM Business Bank and Western Bank; and
commercial real estate lending, operating under the

Washington Mutual brand.
Information about Washington Mutual's deposit,
lending,

investment, retirement and insurance products is

conveniently available on their website.

Except as noted,

I used the website exclusively in my research of their
product offerings and information.
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In conclusion, Washington Mutual's standard consumer

products are simple and straightforward.

Their Free

Checking is the core product that attracts customers to the
bank, and with appropriate sales efforts, additional

products are offered. Their high rate deposit products and
flexible and creative mortgage products set them apart from

their competition.

Their investment and insurance products

are competitive and convenient.

They have an excellent

product mix and a high quality marketing approach.

The next chapter will take a look at Washington
Mutual's financial performance to see whether or not their
products are priced appropriately to be profitable for the

bank.
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CHAPTER EIGHT

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

Earnings for Washington Mutual for the year 1999, were

a record $1.8 billion,
over the prior year.
in 1999,

for a net income growth of 22.2%

Diluted earnings per share were $3.16

$2.56 in 1998, and $1.52 in 1997.

Assets

increased 15.3% to $186.5 billion from $165.4 the prior
Net interest income for 1999 increased only slightly

year.

over the prior year.

This was due to a 13% rise in average

interest-earning assets.
declined to 2.48% in 1999,

The net interest spread, however,
from 2.70% in 1998.

(Washington

Mutual Annual Report, 1999).
Interest-sensitive assets have adjustable rates that
change with movements in short to mid-term market interest
rates.

This is also true of the majority of the

liabilities contributing to the bank's cost of funds.

Market interest rates declined slightly during 1997,
declined further during 1998, and then remained low within

a narrow range during the first half of 1999.

In the last

two quarters of 1999, market interest rates significantly
increased concurrently with increases in short-term rates
by Federal Reserve.
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My analysis indicates that company's yield on loans

declined 33 basis points to 7.40% for 1999,
1998.

from 7.73% for

During 1998, market interest rates declined, which

reduced the yield on new loan originations as well as on

the adjustable rate mortgage portfolio, and encouraged the
prepayment of loans with higher rates.

The impact of the

rise in interest rates in 1999 on the existing portfolio
was not immediately reflected in the yield on the loan
portfolio due to a lag before rates begin to adjust upward
In 1999,

87% of total real estate loans were adjustable

rate loans.

(Washington Mutual Annual Report, 1999).

Five year financial data for the company is shown in

Appendix B of this project and reflects that Washington

Mutual shows consistent gains over the past five years in
income, with the expense ratio increasing during 1999 as a

result of the expenses related to integrating acquisitions
in California.

Net income more than doubled during the

five-year period.

The company's return on equity,

the rate of return

realized by the stockholders on their investment, has

increased from a low of 4.70% in 1996, to 19.66% for 1999
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as a result of the mergers and acquisitions during this

period.
Sales, earnings per share, and dividend growth rates
for Washington Mutual are shown in Table 1 below.

’ Rable :1.

Wa’shington Mutual ‘’Growth?" Rates

;•

Sales %
EPS %

7.49

5 Year

. 3 Year

1 Year

:;

39.35

6.83;
80.15
]

19.03

23.60

14.67; i
! [ 19.51 J :
... :.. 11. .. .'?:..

Dividend

The following table (Table 2)

16.00

shows competitor and

industry key ratios.

Table 2.
\

’

•Medians
... ......... .. ;.
.. .... .''

Industry Comparison - '1998
Profit
Return
Revenue
Earnings
Margin
on
Growth. per,’ share .
Equity
j Growth

Washington Mutual S 21.1
i
.
i

Bank of America

9:97

j \ 20.07
;
1 ' v.. _ k_

'■

59,52

j

86.84

!i

I

■•.11.24

•

. ..

Wells Fargo Bank

Financial..
Services Industry

62.84

! 13.99 i i ~ 19.24. j L
j 12.2
16.4

—:
11.39
;

*

8 • ?8

j [.. 6.65

12 • 8

13.0

U— I

Source: Moody's Industrial Review, Banking Industry Survey, 1999.
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Tab!a 3, below, shows Washington. Mutual's performance
over the past five years as compared to the banking

industry,

the financial sector, and the S&P 500.

Table 3/ Five Year Industry/Secfor/Standard
and Poor 500 Comparison .
■ ;! Washington
Industry Sector S&P 500
_ ; | ,Mutual

Sales

'

i EPS.
Operating
Margin
Net Profit
Margin___
Return on
Assets
Return on
Equity

39.35

23.29

17.25

19,64

19.03

18.01

18.50

20.60

35.11

39.77

27.59

16.96

10.03

14.37;

1.15.13

10.17

1.05
17.27

The figures are shown as five-year averages.

Washington Mutual's financial performance has been good
over the past five years, particularly in delivering value

to the shareholders.

But they have lost over four billion

dollars in deposits from 1998 to 1999, and lost over seven

billion dollars in deposits since 1995.

Some of this

dollar loss is attributable to funds flowing from
traditional banks to the stock market, and some of it

flowed to other institutions as a result of the mergers.
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Washington Mutual, despite the loss of deposits, has been
financially very successful, primarily because they have
offset that loss of deposits with gains in other areas.

They have increased dramatically in assets and net income
as a result of their mergers.

Whether or not they can retain deposits in the future

is a big question for Washington Mutual.

The next chapter

of this project will analyze why customers move their

accounts when mergers occur; and will look specifically at

some of the issues Washington Mutual's customers identified
as being reasons they fled.
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CHAPTER NINE
WHY CUSTOMERS FLEE WHEN
MERGERS OCCUR

This chapter looks at why some customer choose to bank

elsewhere when their bank is taken over by another bank.
Even with the best-orchestrated bank mergers, all customers
of the merged bank must deal with some level of merger-

related inconvenience.

The deeper the relationship the customer has with the
bank,

the greater the inconvenience.

For example, a

customer who has just a simple checking account with a bank

will only suffer the inconvenience of receiving new checks
with a new account number and different rules and fees for

the account.

The new checks are always free, so the major

inconvenience is the fee structure of the account.
If that same customer visits the branch once or twice

a week, has a credit card, overdraft account, and a

certificate of deposit, things are quite different.

When

this customer goes to the bank there may be not be any

parking available due to a closure of a nearby branch.

At

some locations, full-time parking lot attendants are

necessary because of the congestion/

.
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The.lines inside the

bank could be longer because the new bank may be trying to

keep costs down and has fewer tellers available.

There

could be new employees working in the branch and the
tellers he has known for many years are no longer there.
In addition to receiving new checks, he must also receive

The terms and

new credit cards and new ATM cards as well.

conditions of his account are different too.

The

certificate of deposit will pay the old bank's rate of
interest until maturity, but the customer is up to the
mercy of the new bank when the certificate matures.

The

new bank may not be as aggressive about gathering deposits

and may price their certificate rates lower than the old
bank did.

There might also be differences in rules about

early withdrawal penalties and grace periods.

If this

customer used an automated telephone service provided by
the old bank, that will be different too.

And,

if he

prefers to deal with a person over the telephone, he

probably won't be able to talk to anyone at his local
branch.

He'll reach the new bank's call center, where he

may have to hold for the next available employee.

Changing banks is a hassle, particularly when direct
deposits and other pre-determined electronic transactions

44

affect a customer's account.

But if a customer perceives

that it is more of a hassle to continue to bank there than
to make the change, he'll change.

Washington Mutual did lose a number of customers when

mergers occurred for many of the reasons outlined above.

Great Western and Home Savings were considered to be
"hometown" banks to many of their customers and Washington

The sense of loyalty and

Mutual was from out of state.
trust is no longer there.

Very often people just don't like change.

They get

used to what their statements look like, appreciate dealing
with familiar people, and like to make their own choices.

When banks merge, they are in unfamiliar territory all the
way around, and they perceive that their choices have been
taken away from them.
In addition to losing customers for service reasons,
Washington Mutual also lost customers because of FDIC

Insurance on their deposits.

If. a customer had $100,000

Deposited at Great Western, and another $100,000 deposited
at Home Savings before the merger,

insured up to $100,000.

those accounts were each

After the merger,
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they were only

covered up to the $100,000 because they were held at the

same institution.
Despite some service glitches resulting in lost

customers, Washington Mutual has done a lot of things
right.

The next chapter covers the factors that make them

so successful.

46

CHAPTER TEN
WHAT MAKES WASHINGTON
MUTUAL SUCCESSFUL?

Factors that make Washington
Mutual Successful
Distinctive Competencies

Washington Mutual's most striking distinctive

competencies are its leadership, its ability to merge huge
companies into its culture, and its success at gaining

market share very quickly.

The company has strongly identified its markets and

gone after the checking account business as their lead
product.

Their effort is in promoting their brand and

using the checking account to build the primary

relationship with the customer.

Once they have the

customer with the free checking account, they offer
competitive mortgage products, some competitive
investments, and a competitive brokerage in WM Financial

Services, to capture the homeowner and senior markets.
They cater to the consumer market very well with their

customer-oriented philosophy.
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Washington Mutual believes that their niche is to

concentrate on the consumer market while its competitors
split their attention between serving both consumers and
big business.

Their marketing approach is clean and consistent.

They use bold primary colors and an easily identifiable
logo.

Their recent "Let Us Make a Fan Out of You"

advertising campaign seeded the Washington Mutual name into

their newest markets.

The campaign's quirky approach to

explaining how customers feel about Washington Mutual
struck a chord with people.
They have built a strong trust factor with their

customers.

They utilize their marketing dollars to promote

that image of trust,

friendliness, and a sense of

belonging.

Their ability to streamline mortgage loan processing

and fund a high percentage of applications is going to
serve them well in their new markets.

Their mortgage

banking division is among the best in the country in
running an efficient and profitable division.

They have

formed strategic partnerships to maximize profit and reduce

risk.

On the other hand, they are willing to take risk

with some of their non-conventional real estate products
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that are shunned by other lenders.

For example,

fixed rate

loans on manufactured housing units are uncommon elsewhere.
Recent mergers have catapulted the company from coast

to coast, and this helps build brand awareness.

The recent

Bank of America and Wells Fargo mergers have helped

Washington Mutual's image as a friendly, customer-oriented
institution.

They are seen as providers of low cost, high

touch financial products, rather than as cold, unfriendly

banking giants that have alienated many people.

They are

ready and able to compete on the national scene.
Key Success Factors
Washington Mutual has been willing to take risk to
establish a market presence in the Southern California

Market.

Their free checking account and liberal NSF policy

have enabled them to bring customers to their door, and

their array of products has enabled them to capture the

profitable middle market and the upscale segments.

They

have the ability to build relationships and trust with

their customers over time.
They are willing to be a niche lender with their off-

mainstream mortgage financing packages.

They have a

clearly identified marketing strategy and have not deviated
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from it.

Strong brand identity has been built and a

consistent strategy permeates the organization.
Their branch network offers a strong sales and service
approach to banking and has enhanced their ability to build
their deposits base on a per-branch basis that is double

that of standard commercial banks.

The leadership of Washington Mutual has provided the

vision necessary to see that buying a brokerage firm in the

early 1980's would be advantageous and would help with the
disintermediation problem faced by many banks.

The

leadership also realized that growth would come quickly by
merger and acquisition, and, in order to do it
successfully, the company needed to be positioned to handle

the growth and quickly meld the merged institution with
their own culture.

They have proven their ability to analyze the market

and modify as necessary to meet the needs of the market.
They have dramatically changed their image from one of a
traditional institution to a customer-oriented culture,

well recognized in 'the Northwest for providing quality

service and low cost products.

They recognize what they do

best and try not to, be everything t/o • everybody.
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Their

success has come with popular, low-cost products and

customer loyalty.
Now that the strengths of this institution have been

identified, we will see in the next chapter what unique
challenges Washington Mutual faces in today's competitive

banking environment.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN

WHAT FUTURE CHALLENGES EXIST
FOR WASHINGTON MUTUAL?

The momentum that Washington Mutual has built with the

many recent mergers and acquisitions has created enormous
opportunity for them.

The stock market has provided

capital to continue expansion.

Done properly, with

continued focus on the needs of the customer,

their

expansion from a regional institution to a coast-to-coast
institution can help them compete successfully with other

banking giants.
Numerous threats are inherent in such rapid expansion.

They are dealing with different markets than just the
Pacific Northwest, where they are a household name and

where their slightly more folksy approach has appeal.

Their "Friends of the Family®" and "Rodeo Grandma" ad
campaigns won't work in the competitive,

fast paced

Southern California market. The "Rodeo Grandma" ad campaign
was wildly successful in the Northwest, partly for its
humor, and partly for its local flavor,

featuring four

women from Ellensburg dressed in chaps and cowboy hats who

patrolled the Northwest making communities safe for hassle-
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free banking.

While the Northwest market is sophisticated,

the California market is much more cosmopolitan and aloof.
In the Southern California market there is there is less

brand loyalty and more orientation toward convenience and
cost factors.

There was apprehension prior to the merger that there
would be a culture clash with mixing Washington Mutual,

Great Western, American Savings, and H. F. Ahmanson.

The

employee base needed to be carefully managed because a lot
of turnover leads to customer disenfranchisement.

Great

Western and American Savings were already losing market
share, and Californians had no loyalty to the name

Washington Mutual.
Californians.

This is a name that had no meaning to

Most had never heard of the institution

prior to the mergers.

The company has faced negative publicity as branches
were closed and consolidated during the mergers.

The bank

closed 161 branches in California to combine outlets too
close to one another.

The closures and other

consolidations cost nearly 3,500 bank employees their jobs

and displaced thousands of customers, although many are
being moved to branches only a few blocks away.
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Preceded

by the Bank of America merger, public sentiment about bank

consolidations has not been enthusiastic.
It is common knowledge that convenience is still the

primary reason for choosing a bank.

If the most convenient

bank closes its branch, customers have many other choices
and Bank of America and Wells Fargo certainly offer
convenience.

Washington Mutual faced public scrutiny as they
removed the signature mosaics and stained glass from the
Home Savings branches.

These murals and sculptures

depicted scenes from Southern California life, such as
farmers toiling in the fields and Spanish missionaries

encountering Indians.

Some branches, abandoned because of

lack of amenities such as safe-deposit facilities or

limited teller windows, were beautiful marble edifices with
gilt edges reminiscent of another banking era.

amenities,

Customer

such as visibility and parking, determined which

branches would stay, and which would go.
Many of the buildings and mosaics were designed by

Millard Sheets, an architect, muralist and teacher who is
considered the father of the California Watercolor School.
H.F. Ahmanson commissioned Sheets and his Scripps College
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colleagues in the 1960's to create buildings and artwork,

which, in some critics' eyes, became anachronistic as soon
as they were built.

While other banks at the time aimed

for a sleek, modernistic look, Sheets designed monuments to

grandeur and stability.

(Pulliam and Apodaca 1998)

Some post-merger customers of Washington Mutual do not

necessarily believe that bigger is better.

Branch

consolidations resulted in more customers in the branch
lobby, with insufficient bank employees to take care of

them.

The new Washington Mutual branches are handling much

more business than their predecessors because of the

consolidations.

Deposits have increased to an average of

$115 million per branch, compared with $30 million per

branch at other financial institutions.

The company did

not fully appreciate the logistical challenges of operating
large branches.

After all,

this was the first time in

Washington Mutual's history of mergers that existing
locations were closed or consolidated.

They underestimated

their staffing needs.
Some Washington Mutual customers have been so angry
about the changes in service that they have launched web

sites to air their gripes.
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The bank maintains that now that the branch

conversions have been completed, they can focus on
improving efficiency and service to customers.

Financially Washington Mutual has performed well, but
by virtue of being in the money business,

they are

vulnerable to systematic business risks.

The economic and

competitive environments are important since they

profoundly affect expected risk and returns on various
financial and real assets.
The regulatory and legislative environments do not

appear to be a threat to the banking industry, but the
potential risk must continue to be assessed.

Changes in technology are occurring rapidly and
Washington Mutual has not kept up with the latest
innovations.

They were late to introduce ATMs, and they

only recently introduced on-line banking.

Customers want

branch convenience as well as access to their money via

electronic channels.

Certainly the fact that Washington Mutual has actually
lost deposits during its post-merger period is a concern.

They must continue to improve service delivery to win the

loyalty of California customers.
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As described previously,

Californians have many choices.
a customer to move their account,

Though it is not easy for
they will move if there

is a perception of inconvenience or poor service.

Bank mergers have occurred on a large scale over the

past few years.

There is every reason to believe that they

will continue and the complexion of Washington Mutual's

competitors could change.

Southern California has not yet

seen the emergence of some of the large East Coast banks
onto its soil.

First Union, a banking powerhouse in the

South, invaded the Northeast by devouring Core States Bank.
Minneapolis-based First Bank System bought U.S. Bancorp of
Portland Oregon.

National City Bank of Cleveland, Ohio,

merged with First of America in Illinois and Michigan.
Will these banks look to the California market for further

expansion?
Despite the fact that Washington Mutual's mergers were

not without some problems,

excellent.

the future for the company looks

The mergers were completed keeping their

financial soundness intact, and their stock price remained

high, providing value to their shareholders.
Based upon their strategy for expansion, it is likely
that they will continue to merge with other banking firms
to penetrate new markets.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
CONCLUSION

Despite the challenges of orchestrating huge mergers

over the span of a decade, Washington Mutual has earned a
reputation as being a formidable competitor.
In January of 1991, Washington Mutual's executive

management introduced the company's current business

strategy.

The total return to the stockholders surpassed

the total return of every savings institution in the nation
and many of the commercial banks with which is competes on

a daily basis.

Although operations have grown dramatically in recent

years, the company remains committed to the four basic
operating principles that have contributed to its success.
These principles are to: 1.) profitably expand all business
lines, 2.) maintain a high-quality balance sheet,

3.)

constantly seek new ways to operate more efficiently, and

4.)

limit sensitivity to movements in interest rates.

The company intends to deploy capital through the
retention of adjustable-rate and higher-margin loan

originations, and the purchase of additional adjustablerate assets.

They will continue to explore future
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acquisitions that meet their strategy criteria, namely, to
grow to positive earnings within one year,

to pose limited

risk from integration, to maintain balance sheet quality,

and to complement the existing franchise.

Given the size

and scope of Washington Mutual's operations,

it is

important that they keep a mindful eye on costs.

Washington Mutual has taken the approach that they
will use the free checking product to get customers in the

door,

then will earn fee income from the overdraft charges.

The income from fees is high, but it is imperative that

they cross-sell higher yielding products to these
customers.

They must concentrate on improving the quality

of service that suffered after the two large mergers, and

the test will be if they can delivery the quality of
service touted in their television commercials.

While it is impossible to predict the future events

and market conditions that will influence the company's
performance from year to year,

they remain committed to the

execution of a clearly defined business strategy that has
made them one of the most successful institutions.

Washington Mutual is in an excellent position to build
upon the tremendous accomplishments achieved over the past

few years.
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In summary, this project focused on Washington Mutual

as a major competitor to Arrowhead Credit Union.

The paper

covered the history of this banking giant, the banking

industry in the Inland Empire, an analysis of Washington
Mutual's customers and products, a financial analysis of
the company, and the factors that lead to their success as
a banking organization.

It concludes with the

identification of some of the challenges that this
organization faces in today's competitive environment.

The benefit of this project to Arrowhead Credit Union
is that it has brought an understanding of not only this

new competitor, but of the Inland Empire financial market,
and the effect that Washington Mutual had on that market.

The in-depth analysis of the strengths of Washington Mutual

and its products enabled us to compete with this company.
We designed a new free checking product and now use it
as our core product in attracting new business to the

credit union.

We refocused our service strategy to ensure

that we retain our competitive edge as face new entrants to

our market.

We also designed new marketing campaigns to

target customers of Washington Mutual who may have been
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frustrated by the merger and ready to move their accounts
to a local financial institution.

We will continue to use the information gathered in

this project to guide our strategy as we identify new
markets and new ways to meet the needs of our customers.
The benefit to the organization has been enormous and has

changed the way we view our competition.

The benefit to

the reader of this project is in the insight that it

provides about how this little-known company could gain
such a strong foothold in an extremely competitive market.
Finally, the value of this project to the author has

been that it has enabled me to have valuable input to the

molding of our Credit Union strategy.

As the branch

administrator for the Credit Union, I have been able to
share my knowledge of this formidable competitor with our

branch managers to enable them to have more knowledge of
their competition.
I was in awe of Washington Mutual when I was eight

years old making a deposit to my college fund with my

grandfather, and I am even more in awe of them today, now
that I have an understanding of what makes this company so
successful.
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APPENDIX A

MERGER DATA
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WASHINGTON MUTUAL MERGER HISTORY

Number of
Locations

Acquisition wamo

Date Acquired

Columbia Federal Savings Bank and
Shoreline Savings Bank..................

April 29,1988

$551.0

$555.0

$752.6

26

Old Stone Bank (1).....................
Frontier Federal Savings Association121.
Williamsburg Federal Savings Bank 125. .
Vancouver Federal Savings Bank........
CrossLand Savings, FSB (2)..............
Sound Savings and Loan Association. . .
World Savings and Loan Association (2). .
Great Northwest Bank....................
Pioneer Savings Bank....................
Pacific First Bank, A Federal Savings Bank
Far West Federal Savings Bank (2). . . .
Summit Savings Bank....................
Olympus Bank, a Federal Savings Bank. .
Enterprise Bank........................
Western Bank..........................
Utah Federal Savings Bank..............
American Savings Bank, F.A...........

June 1, 1990
June 30, 1990
Sep. 14, 1990
July 31, 1991
Nov. 8, 1991
Jan 1, 1992
March 6, 1992
April 1, 1992
March 1, 1993
April 9, 1993
Apr. 15, 1994
Nov. 14, 1994
Apr. 28, 1995
Aug. 31, 1996
Jan 31, 1996
Nov. 30, 1996
Dec. 20, 1996

229.5
200.1
6.8
603.2
624.5
3,770.7
127.5
237.8
92.8
500.8
88.9
14,562.9

292.6
95.6
4.3
253.4
185.4
20.5
37.8
586.4
659.5
3,831.7
42.2
169.3
278.6
138.5
696.4
106.7
12,815.4

294.0
260.7
23.51
710.4
926.5
5,861.3
188.1
391.4
153.8
776.3
122.1
21,893.

7
6
3
7
15
1
2
17
17
129
3
4
11
1
42
5
224

United Western Financial Group........
Great Western Financial Corp ........

Jan 15, 1997
July 1, 1997

272.7
32,448.3

299.9
27,785.1

16
1,138

H.F. Ahmanson & Company (3)..............

Oct. 1, 1998

33,939.1

33,974.6

404.1
43,769.
8
50,354.

Industrial Bank........................
Long Beach Financial Corp..............
Alta Residential Management Trust. . . .

Dec. 31, 1998
Oct. 1, 1999
Feb. 1 2000

11.1
417.7
156.0

26.1
-

27.2
821.4
158.1

Assets
Loans
Deposits
(dollars in millions)

This was an acquisition of selected assets and liabilities.
The acquisition was of branches and deposits only. The only assets acquired
were branch facilities or loans collateralized by acquired savings deposits.
{3) Includes loans, deposits and assets acquired by Ahmanson from Coast.

(1)
(2>

436
1
66
1

WASHINGTON MUTUAL/AHMANSON MERGER EFFECTS

Washington
Mutual

Ahmanson

Fro Forma

Total Assets

$93,981.1

$52,511.2

$149,176.3

Total Deposits

$50,986.0

$35,386.6

$86,372.6

Total Loans

$67,140.2

$36,405.8

$103,546.0

$481.8

$413.8

$895.6

Net Income

Stockholders Eguity/Assets

5.47%

5.95%

Book Value Per Share

$20.80

$25.87

Stock Price Per Share 3/16/98

$71.75

$65.50

5.47%

$20.91

Retail Branches

892

409

1,252

Loan Offices

187

120

3 07

54

0

54

502

0

502

+1,000

541

+1,541

2,635

1,070

3,705

3.9

2.0

5.9

22,000

9,380

31,380

Commercial Bank Offices
Consumer Finance Offices

Total ATM Locations
Total Banking Locations

Households Served (mm)
Employees

WASHINGTON MUTUAL/GOLDENSTATE BANCORP MERGER EFFECTS

Los Angeles
Rank

Inland
Empire Rank

2

2

Home Savings of America

25

$2,266,696

5

5

Great Western Bank

15

809,329

10

10

American Savings Bank

11

579,014

24

24

Coast Federal Bank

1

. Washington Mutual

J.

•

1

1

Institution

■ 3
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Deposits
(000)

3,819,686

6

12

California Federal Bank

8

8

18

Glendale Federal Bank

6

229,548

19

15

Cenfed Bank

6

406,333

25

6

Redlands Federal Bank

14

807,545

Goldeiistate Bancorp

34

l,972>003

3 .
.

-*
/

•

4

'

. .

_

Inland Empire
Market Share

",

164,647,

...... __j_
528,577

___ 2,_____ _

r f
'

Branches

19.1%
J
..................................... I

-

•

9s8%- ■

1

CHANGE IN BANK DEPOSITS

Inland Empire Bank Deposits 1992-1997 (000)
Ran
k

cn

Banks

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

:92-97
Change

1 Washington
Mutual

3,765,9 3,689,3,768, 72 4,184, 3,958, 3,819,6
01
214
439
86
3
416

2 Bank of
America
GoldenStat
3 e
Bancorp

5,174,4 4,240,4,099, 28 3,852, 3,767, 3,816,6 (1,357,7
828
3
514
710
09
99)
08

4 Wells
Fargo Bank

1,744,2 1,824,1,852, 62 1,906, 1,797, 1,634,3 (109,861
37
331
1
816
76
)
718

Large Bank
Total

12,505, 11,53511,426 ,7 11,796 11,537 11,242, (1,262,9
, 586
55
, 611
674
22)
,994
596

1,821,0 1,781,1,709, 11 1,853, 2,013, 1,792,0
50
213
8
03
346
646

53,785

150,953

MID-SIZED BANK DEPOSITS BY YEAR

Inland Empire Mid-Sized Bank Deposits 1992-1997
Bank

1992

1993

1994

1995

(000)

1996

1997

PFF Bank & Trust

712,644

781,004

802 ,-614

868,543

874,601

894,6

Hemet Federal

570,966

554,881

569,609

566,112

581,502

673,8

Downey Savings
Citizens Business
Bank

393,020

389,078

406,087

486,932

524,691

619, 9

386,312

411,440

456,698

482,547

550,175

589,3

Union Bank

305,355

667,116

606,764

584,765

592,641

550,3

World Savings
Provident Savings

472,481

485,066

497/931

567,677

585,578

603,4

466,219

468,773

480,362

492,509

487,395

517,3

3,306,997

3,757,358

3,820,065

4,049,085

4,196,583

4,449,4

Total

BANK DEPOSITS BY SIZE
Inland Empire Financial Institutions, By Size 1992-1997 (000)

Institutions
Banks
(0ver$1.5 bi.)

1992

1993

1994

1996

1995

92-97Chg

1997

11,242,674 (1,262,922)

12,505,596

11,535,586

11,426,755

11,796,994

11,537,611

Banks
(400 - $900 mi.)

3,306,997

3,757,358

3,820,065

4,049,085

4,196,583

4,449,410

1,142,413

Banks
(Under $250 mi.)

3,230,888

2,914,389

2,755,578

2,729,928

2,886,161

3,158,888

(72,000)

708,305

580,576

0

0

0

0

(708,305)

940,060

984,042

1,042,439

1,080,443

1,126,087

1,180,962

240,902

20,691,846

19,771,951

19,385,467

19,656,450

19,746,442

20,031,934

(659,912)

LA Banks (now gone)

Credit Unions
Total

BANK MARKET SHARE
Market Share, Inland Empire Financial Institutions 1992-1997
No.

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

4

60.4%

58.3%

58.9%

60.0%

58.-4%

56.1%

Banks
($400-$900 mi.)

7

16.0%

19.0%

19.7%

20.6%

21.3%

22.2%

Banks
(Under $250 mi.)

47

15.6%

14.7%

14.2%

13.9%

14.6%

15.8%

3

3.4%

2.9%

1.8%

0.0%

0.0

0.0%

Credit Unions

37

4.5%

5.0%

5.4%

5.7%

5.7%

5.9%

Total

98

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Institutions
Banks
(Over $1.5

bi.)

CD

L. A. Banks
(Now gone)

APPENDIX B
PRODUCT COMPARISON
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FREE CHECKING PRODUCT COMPARISON
Washington
Mutual

Bank of
America

Wells Fargo

California
Federal ■

Account
..Name

Free
Checking

Versatel®
Checking

Custom
Checking

Infinity
Checking

Minimum
balance to
waive fee

$°

$0

$1,000

$750

$5.50
without
direct
deposit

$8.00,
waived with
direct
deposit

$8.00,
waived with
direct
deposit

$0

$0

Not
required
Cancelled
checks
returned
for $2 fee

Not
required
Cancelled
checks
returned
for $2 fee

Not required
Cancelled
checks
returned for
$2 fee

$0

$0

6 free
calls per
month, then
$.50 for
automated
and $1.50
for
assisted
calls

$2 for each
assisted
call.
Unlimited
for
automated
calls

6 free calls
per month,
then $.50
for
automated
and $1.50
for assisted
calls

Required to
waive
monthly fee

Required to
waive
monthly fee

Required to
waive
monthly fee

Monthly
■ fee'

$0

Fee for
ATM or
check card

$0

Check
safekeep
ing
required

Not
required

...\Fee .to ^-./
access
teller in
branch .

./fee. to
,
access
telephone
banking

Direct
deposit
required

$0

$0

Not
required

$2 per
deposit or
withdrawal
in branch

$.25 for
purchases

Source: Washington Mutual Weibsite, 1999
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WASHINGTON MUTUAL SAVINGS ACCOUNT PRODUCTS

Money
State
Market.
ment'
Savings .Account

■ Minimum
balance'
to open

MonthlyFee

Deposit
With. drawals
Allowed

Automatic
Deposits
Required

.

Guaranteed
Rate
Money
Market
Account

Tradi
tional
CD

Liquid
CD

$5

$1000

$5000

$1000

$5000

$3 per
month
if
under
$300
balance

$10 per
month
if
under
$2500
balance

$12 per
month if
under
$5000
balance

no fee
penalty
for
early
with
drawal

no fee
penal
ty for
early
with
drawal

yes

yes

yes

Depos
its
allowed

Depos
its
allowed

yes

no

no

no

no

Source; Washington Mutual Website, 1999
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APPENDIX C

ECONOMIC DATA
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Population Growth
(source: U.S. Census Bureau)

<1

□ Riverside County

B San Bernardino County

Per-Capita Income
(source: U.S. Department of Commerce)

□ Riverside County
<1
cn

■ San Bernardino County

Age Distribution
(source: U.S. Census Bureau)

65 and older

4 and under

11%

9%

25 to 44
31%

Job Growth by Sector
(source: U.S. Census Bureau)

Retail

Government

Finance & Real Estate

Services

Manufacturing

Transportation

Construction

-------------------- ---------------

-s -------------.------- a--------10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Unemployment
Annual Averages
(source: California Employment Development Department)

□ Riverside County

-J
00

BSan Bernardino County

Consumer Price Index
Change in Annual Rate of Inflation
(source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics)

Purchasing Managers Index
1999 Inland Empire Report
(source: Institute of Applied Research and Policy)

Financial Sector Employment
Number of Inland Empire Jobs
(source: California Employment Development)

Financial Institution Branches
(source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.)

oo
bo

□ Riverside County
HSan Bernardino County

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Financial Institution Deposits
(source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.)

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

APPENDIX D

WASHINGTON MUTUAL FINANCIAL DATA
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WASHINGTON MUTUAL

INCOME STATEMENT
YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31,

1999

00

(Jl

1996
1998
1997
(Dollars in Thous ands, Except Per Share Amounts)

Interst income
$12,062, 198 $11,221,468 $10,202,531
Interest expense
7,610, 408
6,929,743
6,287,038
Net interest income
4,451, 790
4,291,725
3,915,493
Provision for loan losses
167, 076
268,642
161,968
Noninterest income
1,508, 997
980,535
1,507,200
Noninterest expense
2,909, 551
3,267,500
3,111,117
Income before income taxes,
cumulative effect of accounting
changes, and minority interest
2,884, 160
2,369,457
1,538,269
Income taxes
1,067, 096
653,151
882,525
Cumulative effect of change in
tax accounting method
Minority interest in earnings of
consolidated subsidiaries
Net income
1,817, 064
1,486,932
885,118
Net income per common share:
Basic
3 .17
1.56
2.61
Diluted
3 .16
1.52
2.56

1995

$9,892,290
6,027,177
3,865,113
498,568
819,361
3,595,271

$9,860,408
6,306,724
3,553,684
344,624
1,224,370
2,761,174

590,635
201,707

1,672,256
654,593

234,742

375,358

15,793
767,128

0.55
0.54

1.23
1.21

vmnNSiasi

mutual

Balance Sheet
YEAR EMZED LECEDGER 31z

1999

1998

1996
1997
(DelLars in Thcsusairte)

1995

Assets
$186,513,630 $165,493,281 $143,522,398 $137,328,541 $137,142,972
Available-for-sale
31,181,617
securities
41,384,318
32,917,053
25,431,464
19,817,226
Held-tcHmaturity
securities
14,129,482
10,967,204
19,401,465
17,207,854
9,605,367
Isens
113,497,225
108,370,906
85,335,568
97,624,348
92,943,126
Deposits
85,492,141
81,129,768
83,429,433
87,509,358
88,019,469
Borrowings
94,326,616
38,261,697
65,200,489
49,976,377
40,014,735
Stoc^±lolders, equity
8,421,102
9,052,679
9,344,400
7,426,137
7,601,085
Number of comm shares
cutstanding at aid
583,622,187
of period
559,589,273
501,400,525
550,689,721
554,811,012
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